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Abstract It is considered the problem of the reliability increase of the emergency power system of major energy objects 
auxiliaries with the supply of various energy sources (diesel and hydroelectric generators). The effect of the additional redundancy 
on the probability of emergency power system fault is studied. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The experience of energy objects exploitation shows 
that the failures of the power generating units, power 
transfer systems and loads can lead to the necessity of 
hitch and sometimes to the loss of power plant auxiliaries 
supply. 
The accident at Fukusima-1 NPP shows that the 
consequences of nuclear reactor accidents connected with 
the de-energization of the reactor shut-down cooling 
system are of a global character. De-energization is the 
initiating event of more than a half of accidents that lead 
to the reactor core damage. 
By tradition the NPP and other major objects 
auxiliaries redundancy is supplied with diesel generators. 
But insufficient reliability of high-power diesel 
generators, oil and fuel supply systems and pneumatic or 
electric starting systems reduce the possibility of fast and 
full-scale energy supply and accident development 
prevention. 
In [1], on the base of diesel generator failure data, it is 
given the estimation of the failure probability of a system 
consisting of three diesel generators considering common 
cause failures. In the case of independent elements of the 
system the startup failure probability is 2,7·10-5, including 
common cause failures. The system failure probability is 
estimated as 6·10-4. That is why we can’t consider the 
diesel generator failures independent. To receive the 
objective definition of the NPP safety systems reliability it 
is necessary to consider the common cause failures. These 
failures can be caused by the integration of safety systems 
and equipment and auxiliaries, maintenance ways, 
fabrication methods, materials etc. 
The use of systems of various operation principle 
allows to avoid the common cause failures. If the NPP has 
a cooling pond, hydroelectric generators of nearby low-
power hydroplant can be used as an additional 
independent power source [2]. 
 
II. METHOD OF ESTIMATION OF EMERGENCY POWER 
SYSTEM FAILURE 
To develop the emergency power system estimation 
method given in [1], we consider the possibility to 
increase the system reliability by the introduction of 
various operation principle sources for the redundancy. 
The systems of high reliability specifications use the 
redundancy from several sources. Each unit is able to 
fulfill the system functions. In the case of outward de-
energizing the independent redundancy power supply 
channels come into operation by turn. The startup failure 
probability of a system consisting of m independent 
sources is: 
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where q – is a single source failure probability. 
The system of one-type elements can fail due to both 
independent failures (qi) and common cause failures (qc), 
the failure probability appears as a sum of q=qi+qc. The 
common cause failure probability is defined as a function 
of a number of independent single failures: qc=δ·qi. 
Considering the common cause failures the fault 
probability of a system consysting of m single-type 
elements is defined as: 
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The use of polytipic elements is a way to reduce the 
common cause failure probability. In the case of elements 
of n types, the failure probability is: 
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III. ANALYSES OF AUXILIARIES SUPPLY SYSTEM WITH 
CONSIDERATION OF COMMON CAUSE FAILURES 
According to [1] the probability of a single diesel 
generator failure is 3·10-2. There is δ2≈8.2% and δ3≈0.72% 
failures of two- and three-unit system, respectively, per 
one independent failure. 
The failure probability of the system consisting of three 
diesel-generators considering possible common cause 
failures can be calculated from (2). The common cause 
failure probability of one of single-type elements qc can be 
evaluated from: 
.
3
3 cii qqq +=⋅δ   (4) 
The considered system of three elements has 
qc=1.9·10-4 (Fig. 1). The comparison of the diesel 
generators [1] and independent elements failure 
probabilities is given in the Table I. It results from the 
comparison that the contribution of common cause 
failures is crucial and it is necessary to guard the system 
from such failures. 
The failure probability of a system of various-typed 
sources shown on Fig. 2 considering the common cause 
failure of syngle-type elements can be evaluated from: 
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where qH – a hydropower unit failure probability. 
 
TABLE I 
THE THREE DIESEL-GENERATOR SYSTEM FAILURE 
PROBABILITIES 
 
 Statistic data [1] The case of 
independent elements 
Failure 
probability 
2.16·10-4 2.7·10-5 
 
 
Fig. 1. A system of single-typed elements failure probability as a 
function of number of diesel generators considering the common cause 
failure probability 
 
1 
1 
1 
2 
 
Fig. 2. The scheme of an emergency power system with sources of 
various operating principle: 
1 – diesel generator; 2 – hydropower unit 
 
If qH=qD=qi+qc=3.02·10-2, then the system (Fig. 2) has 
Q3D+H=6.5·10-6. The system of four diesel generators has 
Q4D=1.9·10-4. 
The increase in the number of hydropower units leads 
to the reduction of the system failure probability. For 
example, the system of three diesel generators and three 
hydropower units has Q3D+3H=4.7·10-8. Further increase in 
the number of hydropower units does not give any 
considerable effect on the failure probability due to the 
impact of common cause failures. 
The reduction of failure probability to 10-7…10-8 
corresponds to the reliability requirements of the up-to-
date and prospective types of nuclear energy equipment. 
The performed calculation shows that the equipping of 
storage ponds with gated outlets with additional 
hydropower plants can essentially raise the reliability and 
safety of Sverdlovsk region major energy objects, such as 
Beloyarskaya NPP, Reftinskaya and Sredneuralskaya 
thermal power plants etc. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The existing methods of the emergency power systems 
reliability estimation do not consider the impact of the 
diversity of elements. The offered method considers the 
failures of single-type elements by the introduction of 
common cause failure probability. The developed method 
can be used to estimate the failure probability of the 
systems consisting of polytypic elements because of the 
relative model simplicity and the sufficient result 
accuracy. 
The results of the NPP auxiliaries emergency power 
system analyses afford ground for the conclusion that high 
value of the diesel generator common cause failure 
probability (~1.9·10-4) essentially limits the achievable 
value of reliability. The use of cooling pond potential with 
hydropower units can provide the additional growth of 
reliability. Considering the made assumptions, the use of 
three additional units of low-power hydroelectric plant in 
the system of three diesel generators can reduce the failure 
probability by order of magnitude greater than 1000 and 
achieve the value of 4.7·10-8. 
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